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We offer a partial articulation of the threats and opportu-
nities posed by the so-called Dark Web (DW). We go on
to propose a novel DW attack detection and prediction
model. Signalling aspects are considered wherein the
DW is seen to comprise a low cost signaling environ-
ment. This holds inherent dangers as well as rewards
for investigators as well as those with criminal intent.
Suspected DW perpetrators typically act entirely in their
own self-interest (e.g. illicit financial gain, terrorism,
propagation of extremist views, extreme forms of racism,
pornography, and politics; so-called ‘radicalisation’).
DW investigators therefore need to be suitably risk aware
such that the construction of a credible legally admissi-
ble, robust evidence trail does not expose investigators to
undue operational or legal risk.
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1. Introduction
The so-called “Hidden” orDarkWeb (HW;DW)
comprises a heterogeneous collection of P2P
oriented Intranet/Internet Open Source custo-
misable search engines (such as ‘YaCy’
http://yacy.net), “‘Search by the People for
the People”; distributed and dynamic P2P file-
exchange e-communities that in turn support an
equally diverse, “rich” collection of DW acces-
sible digital materials. DW resources are not al-
ways fully visible to generic search engines such
as Google, Mozilla, Firefox or Opera. Rather,
DW sites (including “black-listed” DNS) are
typically only visible, hence exploitable both by
legitimate users and those with criminal/illicit
intentions through the use of a variety of Open-
source (i.e. community authored) tools that lever-
age, hence seek to exploit various “niche” DW
e-silos. This presents a technical challenge
wherein an e-silo is physically distributed (i.e.
fragmented across thousands of nodes known
as P2P clients). Typically, freeware down-
loads provide client access for nontechnical
users. Devices can be leveraged by theDW with
or without a user’s explicit consent or know-
ledge. Furthermore, identity “hiding” (e.g. IP
address obfuscation) is integral to the DW. Pub-
lic domain tools are freely available that quickly
delete (beyond forensic recovery) both client-
side files andDWrelated user browsing/privacy
traces. However, recently [1], there has been
some progress as regards the capture of client
side registry “traces” that can establish previous
uTorrent (i.e. P2P) usage, usage patterns un-
known to the user of the uTorrent client. Users
of the HW may therefore be engaging in activ-
ities under a false premise: namely, their ac-
tivities are “untraceable”, when in reality, they
may be exposing themselves to unquantifiable
risks. Of course, such HW registry “traces” are
not typically robust. However, the main draw-
back of this approach is obvious: we often do
not know, let alone establish with certainty, in
a timely and opportune manner, their location,
hence location of local client devices, remote
device storage facilities or otherwise seize sus-
pect devices. Human goal and usage diversity
with partial investigative opacity are central to
the modus operandi of the DW. From a theo-
retical perspective, Gambetta [2] has previously
explored various ways in which mimicry, de-
ception and identity verification operate within
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criminal gangs such as the Mafia. His perspec-
tive is sociological rather than linguistic, infor-
mally presented rather than rigorous [2]. Crimi-
nals typically seek to communicate in ways de-
signed to obfuscate their “true” identities. This
raises intriguing notions of mimicry and de-
ception in a so-called semi-sorted equilibrium
signalling environment wherein it is relatively
cheap to emit false surface level signs as be-
tween signaller-receiver in which “false” iden-
tity cues are emitted by an individual or group of
individuals within a given community of inter-
est. This serves to encourage false inference
formation as to the (inferable but ultimately
unknowable) hidden cognitive trust-warranting
properties (such as honesty, integrity, unselfish-
ness, reliability). The true motives hence in-
tents of an active participant within a given DW
community of interest (consumer, receiver, up-
loader, tracker, content moderator) may be par-
tially or fully opaque to those who are not mem-
bers of that community of interest. This serves
to encourage mimics (using false manifesta),
since it is relatively easy i.e. low cost, to create
a false set of e-identities or set of e-personas.
Typically, signallers use a restricted code of
some kind, wherein a linguistic cue, code word,
series of words, phrases derived often from nor-
mative interlocutory acts (i.e. apparently “inno-
cent” speech acts) serve to obfuscate and plan
criminal intents and actions [3].
2. Signalling Aspects: Low Cost, High Risk?
One of the relatively unexplored areas from an
academic perspective is that of the signalling
exchanges between sender and recipient within
Torrent DW contexts. Though Gambetta [1] has
sought to partially explicate signalling within
high cost criminal closed worlds such as prison
environments, and French [3] has developed a
semi-formalisation of signalling within e-com-
merce contexts wherein mimicry and decep-
tion are often manifest, little work has hith-
erto been undertaken to formalise DW e-silo
signallers within the specific context of a Tor-
rent VO community of interest. Table 1 (be-
low) seeks to offer an enumeration of some
of the most obvious signaller/receiver node
types that also seeks to characterise victimi-
sation aspects and maps these to levels of an
e-trust ladder given elsewhere [3]. Paradoxi-
cally, within low-cost signalling contexts such
as e-DW communities of interest, it is often rel-
atively simple for anyone to join or to receive
illegal (e.g. “extreme” pornographic materials)
using freely available user-friendly/installable
uTorrent clients. However, this ease of adoption
and accessibility does confer dangers with re-
spect to victimisation and incrimination aspects
of those with “honest” intent, who are seeking
to engage (as mimic participants) for the pur-
poses of gathering evidence from within DW
VO communities.
Given that cyber-traffic analysis across a multi-
tude of nodes wherein payloads are distributed
across hundreds (theoretically thousands) of
P2P DW participants is in itself a complex, not
to say potentially intractable area, the Table 1
represents an idealistic reverse engineered set of
participants. Despite difficulties for investiga-
tors, it is feasible to not only identify the main
players (ie. active nodes), but also to analyse
cyber-traffic patterns between nodes.
Role Relative Cost Danger ofVictimisation? e-Trust level[3]
DW Member (receiver only) Low High Social, semantic,syntactic
DW Member (sender/receiver)
e.g. “moderator” Low Low
Social, semantic,
syntactic+empiric
DW Victim (e.g. photographed,
coerced or “willing”) participant Medium/high V High Social, semantic
Casual visitor/surfer/accidental
visitor (receiver only) Low High Semantic, syntactic
Covert Police/law enforcement operative
(Trojan)/Overt participant mimic Low Low
Social, semantic,
syntactic
Table 1. DW VO signal and receivers: extreme pornography scenario.
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2.1. A Semiotic-theoretic Approach to Low
Cost Signalling
Computational models of trust mechanisms
based on explicating notion of trust in the con-
text ofVOe-services have only recently emerged
[4]. One need for this is that traditional security
mechanisms are being increasingly challenged
by open, large scale and decentralised environ-
ments. This situation naturally leads to a highly
decentralised model of security, risk and trust
between VO partners in some pre-determined
orchestrated manner. Several works are cur-
rently examining relevant trust issues at the VO
level of abstraction, including the work from the
TrustCOM project [4]. These works claim to
deal with high-level “reputation” issues. How-
ever, much of these works actually seek merely
to address tangible security aspects and perfor-
mance aspects. Among the first works to estab-
lish the need to examine “soft” trust issues are
those described in Song [5]. Their trust index
is calculated using a mixture of inputs includ-
ing the site’s defence capabilities and site rep-
utation, defined as a performance track record.
Their solution is relatively “heavy-weight”. A
large number of inputs are used to calculate the
trust index, via the use of neural network based
techniques.
Nevertheless, many kinds of deception on the
web involve low cost identity signalling which
engender false trust semiosis due to low cost of
emitting false signals. One of the most common
is so-called ‘phishing’ attacks. These have been
considered in some detail by [6]. In essence, a
phishing attack is a form of deception in which
a consumer is tricked into logging on to a fake
website by means of a fake e-mail in order to
steal their identity. It is successful because of
the cheapness with which an adversary can emit
false identity signs (i.e. create an e-mail con-
taining an embedded URL, that lures the on-
line consumer into the trap). One reason why
such deceptions are effective is the conceptual
gap between a typical e-banking site customer’s
model of the IT system and the IT system’s ac-
tual behaviour.
Another reason is that of a temporal delay as
regards semiosis. Sign and signal exchanges at
the protocol level are ultimately interpreted by
human agents. Such surface level signs usu-
ally take the form of system messages, ren-
dered using a browser, an e-mail client or similar
tool. However, there exists a temporal delay, as
well as an information gap and trust asymmetry,
whereby the human actors are only able to cor-
rectly interpret the meanings of these exchanges
(infer trust or mistrust) after a lengthy and ‘hid-
den’ sign and signal exchange between ‘hidden’
or partially visible technological agents. Often
such agents generate messages at the HCI level
that users cannot easily interpret (such as Digi-
tal Certificate “out of date”). Some signs (hence
signals) are more reliable than others, hence de-
coding such signs and assigning meaning in the
form of trust signals is a game beset by decep-
tion and mimicry. Below the interface level at
the machine level, protocols such as SSL/TLS
rely on the ’hidden’ exchange of signals be-
tween server and client. These signals are not
directly observable by humans at the time of
exchange, but are later presented to users in a
delayed manner in the form of system messages
and warnings by the software.
Trust has been studied from each and every an-
gle: in the philosophical, sociological, psycho-
logical, scientific, economic, and legal sense –
to name just a few. One perennial barrier to
synthesising a definitive trust model and theory
of trust is the lack of agreement as to definitions
of trust. Indeed, one of the central difficulties is
that the notion of trust is closely related to other
concepts such as ability, benevolence, integrity,
reliance, competence, and credibility [7]. Nev-
ertheless, it is possible to identify a core body of
work with specific context to trust and usability
[8]. Cultural factors pre-determine a consumer’s
given set of trust expectations (trust branding,
text vs. graphics, written narrative and on-line
guarantees), [9]. Further, that these expecta-
tions match generic societal and social attitudes
and social structures within target countries.
The premise is that a set of given computer
based signs assembled into a coherent user ex-
perience induce differential consumer reactions
according to a particular consumers cultural ori-
entation and belief system. As yet, however,
the field of cross-cultural trust research is rel-
atively immature. For example, it is still not
known with any certainty, how trust formation
differs between one target group and another,
other than by exhaustive empirical and compar-
ative studies. The evidence that has emerged is
at best tentative in relation to trust issues.
Indeed, numerous studies have identified a num-
ber of trust building factors within the on-line
user experience. These include: an effective
navigation model, contact information, the em-
bedding of human forms, and the use of trust
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seals. These and other design features com-
bine so as to create what might best be termed a
measurable user confidence level, mediated by
inherent risk and reward. This confidence level
appears to comprise both an affective and ratio-
nal component [4]. Hence, unintended or rather
general system interface properties such as the
use of colour combinations, visual metaphors,
or the use of specific types of fonts (etc.) can
potentially influence user trust formation – not
just obvious tangible security features or trust
seals. In essence, it seems that various surface
level signs and signals of trust are perceived (de-
coded) by users in relation to trust aspects of an
interface. From these signs and signals, users
infer hidden trust warranting properties such as
benevolence, honesty, and integrity (etc.).
Furthermore, users build an expectation as to
the future behavioural properties of an interface
as they engage. Thus, we trust a user interface
to perform a particular task if and only if we
expect that the likelihood that the system will
fulfil its obligation lies above our own personal
trust confidence threshold. This notion has im-
portant implications. Namely, both honest and
dishonest (malevolent) DW designers should
not simply assume that specific trust building
factors or individual trust thresholds are univer-
sal across every culture, individual or usabil-
ity context. Indeed, there is ample evidence to
the contrary [10]. Nor should they assume that
confidence levels and behavioural expectations
remain static: rather, they are dynamic and are
continuously informed and driven by external
events in the “real world” of the user and also,
of course, by the user’s own immediate and di-
rect experience of the interface itself. (One
only has to think of the recent “credit crunch”
and the consequent measurable global rise of
distrust in banks to realise how easily external
events can dynamically influence trust thresh-
olds). Trust building factors and trust require-
ments need therefore to be explicitly addressed
as an integral part of interface design. If us-
ability trust requirements are simply taken for
granted, or allowed to remain implicit, then user
adoption and acceptance may be compromised.
Recommended Actions: Trust requirements
(both intangible and tangible security) should
be separately articulated, but need to be seen as
integral to the specification, analysis, and de-
sign, of a computer interface. System designers
should make such trust requirements fully ex-
plicit. It is also necessary to consider the role of
rational judgement aswell as the role of emotion
(affect). Do not make the mistake of thinking
that embedding visible tangible security signs
alone equates to trust building. It is more likely
that users decode a particular interface design
as they experience it, using a wide variety of
interface features so as to build their own con-
fidence level. Try therefore to seek ways to
support user trust formation – by designing “in”
known trust building properties that not only
support user confidence levels, but which also
reinforce positive user expectations. For honest
designers it is essential to identify signs of trust
that are not easily reproducible by malevolent
designers (e.g. designers of fake anti-virus soft-
ware packages that actually serve to infect rather
than disinfect client devices). Indeed, the latter
area is worthy of a separate research initiative in
its own right, that is, deployment of trust signs
within an environment beset by mimicry.
3. Dark Web Groups, Attack Modus
Operandi and Harvesters
TheDWoffers a virtual-worldwherein informa-
tion based cyber-warfare is being carried out be-
tween organised crime, terrorist groups, extrem-
ists of various kinds and the agencies acting on
behalf of a civil society. There has been limited
focused crawling work carried out in relation to
the DW. Prior hidden web research has sought
to mostly focus upon automated form filling or
query redirection to hidden databases, i.e., ac-
cessibility issues. There has been little emphasis
on building topic-specific web page collections
from these hidden sources: that is to say, specif-
ically targeted at harvesting Dark Web content
pertaining to hate and extremist groups. Har-
vesting the DW is certainly non-trivial, however
academics have entered this domain with some
success [11]. Leveraging AI techniques that
accurately identify the authorship of heteroge-
neous postings and web-site contents, Chen [11]
and his co-workers were able to identify DW
groups and trace their activities. As a low cost
semi-sorted equilibrium environment, the DW
offers a signalling environment which is inher-
ently open, transparent and is beset by mimicry.
This offers potential for deception and obfusca-
tion; equally, it is possible through using high-
performance computational resources to reverse
engineer DW groups and their activities from
an analysis of “big-data” i.e. DW traffic, post-
ings, web-sites and their contents. However,
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it would appear that there exists an asymmetry
wherein DW activities have remained largely
undetected.
With respect to our present foci, DW groups
of potential interest are those that launch ac-
tive attacks against intellectual property that
typically lies exposed to an internet connec-
tion. This comprises a vast data set, wherein
patents, secrets, inventions are potentially tar-
geted (harvested) by criminal gangs. Typically,
such attacks have compromised large corporate
servers, e-Government data silos and so forth.
Some have coined these activities “crimeware”
whilst for others the field is a broad one com-
prising many forms of simple to complex attack
configurations, typically, but not exclusively or-
chestrated by DW groups. The so-called “Hid-
den Lynx” cyberspy gang has waged targeted at-
tacks since at least 2009. Attacks include the in-
jection of malware into legitimate websites fre-
quented by their targeted sectors, mainly from
financial services firms in the U.S. Symantec
has alleged that the gang is also tied toOperation
Aurora, which targeted Google, Intel, Adobe,
and other major U.S. firms, which was revealed
in 2010. The main concern from a national
security perspective are those groups who re-
main partially or completely covert wherein the
first that is known is reverse engineered from a
“zero” day attack.
4. Attack Detection Using Evolving
Adversarial Behaviour in
Cyber Clusters
Cyber attack projection has been classified as
an L3 fusion problem based on a revised model
introduced in [12]. The added complexity from
dynamic changing parameters has been stud-
ied in [13] where a separation between the cy-
ber attack methods used for detection and the
modelling of network configuration is achieved.
In an attempt to assure untraceability and un-
detectability between entities, as part of the
communication process, confidentiality mech-
anisms have proved insufficient to address at-
tacks against those principles. In addition, dif-
ferent international laws and cross-continental
cyber crimes are still far away from getting af-
fected by a global public policy on allowed/pro-
hibited data flows. The complexity and de-
centralisation management provided by anony-
mous networks can lead to information leakage
that can be potentially catastrophic in the hands
of an adversary. This plethora of virtual connec-
tions overmultiple hops can offer the privacy re-
quired between the communication partiesmak-
ing identification and traceability a difficult task
to be achieved with some trade offs, especially
between anonymity and performance, in dy-
namic P2P establishments. Assuming that the
notion of security in any electronic communi-
cation is not absolute, even with minimization
of exploitable bugs in a given application, this
does not assure that the number of attack vec-
tors will be reduced, but rather change. The
outcomes from each individual assessment are
then fused so as to determine targeted entities
(i.e. attack intentions). Contextual information
from IDS logs is also used as an input in several
studies using a variety of tools for that purpose
[14][15]. Thework presented at this section is an
extension of our work presented in [16] where
both the model and the resulting algorithm are
formalised.
We present a preliminary P2P intrusion fore-
casting model based on a “guilty by associa-
tion” approach. We employ the notion of a
cyber community Cp where p is the number
of participants (nodes) in any given “transac-
tion”, wherein p ≥ 2. We do not attempt here
to differentiate between different types of P2P
communicative acts within or across shared DW
Cp communities. We divide a cluster s of cyber-
space S based on a set A, of parameters that rep-
resent a set of common interests between pairs
of active nodes in a given cyber community Cp.
The actual scale of such a communication net-
work can play a crucial role in terms of the
anonymity level preserved as part of its core
operation(s). There is also a distinct trade off
between the anonymity preservation properties
of such networks and the size and number of
participants in the actual communication pro-
cess with elements such as trust and reputation
adding further complexity to an attempt to quan-
tify anonymity and privacy levels.
Each p in Cp typically manifests itself as a set
of network traffic patterns Tp. Namely, Tp are
specific to the requirements hence communica-
tion protocols used within any Cp. Identifying
Cp is an “NP-hard” problem. This is due to the
complexity of Cp possible node cluster config-
urations (sparse, loose, and richly connected),
that comprise Cp. The space is compartmen-
talized and expanded exponentially as a set of
s clusters such that members can join multiple
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Cp, hence, engage in DW P2P activities. We
define a cyber community of “shared interests”







We postulate that the probability of each at-






Although the communication protocol is com-
mon within transactions between nodes in a
highly decentralised fashion, logical accessibil-
ity from one cluster to a different one is subject
to different security requirements. These in-
clude vulnerabilities and dynamically changing
attack vectors. A typical example is advanced
invasive attacks where re-engineering of the at-
tack vectors to evade security mechanisms at
the network perimeter is a common manifes-
tation of such multi-stage cyber attacks. The









We propose that each participative communica-
tive state-space path will provide a reliable es-
timate for the set of sender-receiver commu-
nicative temporal dynamics between potential
attacker-to-victim pairs, within or across single
or multiple Cp. Zero-trust is assumed in this en-
vironment as data and service metrics for each
node define equal importance to other nodes in
the same or different clusters s. This renders all
nodes relevant and important to the criticality of
a secure network operation. Attackers’ motive
might be diverse as focus can be on any node
in the cluster, given that they all carry equal
criticality for overall cluster health. Informa-
tion from updated CVE databases can be used
to quantify criticality levels in each cluster for
different services provided (local or remote) for
each node p ⊂ s. Each cluster could be subject
to certain sequenced attacks that generate dif-
ferent alerts at each node p with at least 2 nodes
presented in that cluster.
The nature of the protocol and network used
does not seek to accommodate a clearly defined
network perimeter where alerts are centrally
generated. Our model assumes little informa-
tion regarding prior attack behaviour or attack
attributes in a given cluster. Failed attacks can
also yield information about attack capabilities
and motives within one or more clusters in a
P2P network. For example, DHT routing poi-
soning attacks can yield valuable information
about DoS capabilities an adversary might em-
ploy against a specific node or a set of nodes
within a specific cluster. The problem of entity-
to-identity mapping in such environments plays
a crucial role also in identifying attackers’ ca-
pabilities. If an adversary can leverage a num-
ber of multiple identities he/she may control a
significant portion of the cluster, thus dictating
adaptations to current threat modelling. Imme-
diate affects to data integrity and redundancy
have been manifested in such networks as a re-
sult of this mapping [17][18][19]. It is assumed
that field intelligence can be used so as to in-
crease predictive accuracy over time. Following
the work of [20], specifically their Exponential
Weighted Moving Average (EWMA), the par-





(1−)t−(t−1)∗ Tpa1cp(t′) ∗ Cp
100
(4)
where  is the smoothing coefficient; t′ the span
of the attacker’s participation windowpresented
to Cp, and 1 being the first time an attacker can
be linkedwith any given community,with (t+1)
being the most recent. We assume the probabil-
ity of an attack increases as the association rate
of an attacker increases. It follows that:
 Tpaicp(t + 1) > 1 (5)
This serves to increase attack probability. Par-
ticipation alone, without the evidence derived
from inter-nodal activities, is not sufficient. The
population density of a cluster plays a strong
protagonist role in providing an accurate es-
timate of future attacks. The transaction rate










As the infrastructure is a P2P environment, there
is no distinction to bemade between internal and
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external network segments. The assumption is
made that each cluster s is not seen in isolation
from the rest of the space S as each node p can
simultaneously participate in more than one s
at the same time. Indeed, deriving models that
capture evolving attacker behaviour is far from
an easy task. Several indicators can suggest pre-
diction capabilities based on attackers’ actions
and defenders’ responses serve to model po-
tential predictive information for future attacks
[21][22]. We collect statistical information com-
prising participation rates, that manifests both
legitimate and adversarial behaviour based on
traffic parameters Tp (see Figure 1).
The objective is to use core network elements
and participation rates to detect predictability
of an event rather than predicting its actual evo-
lution over time. Each node in the environ-
ment will adopt a time-varying posture based
on information that classifies activities as mali-
cious or innocent hence minimize defence pre-
dictability. Each instance of activity is a de-
cision vector x ∈ R‖ || where  is a set of
network parameters including logs, participa-
tion and transaction rates within and across each
cluster. These metrics provide the metric to dif-
ferentiate between innocent nodes and attackers
(see dark grey spots shown in Figure 1). These
states describe participation rates influenced by
resources, shared items of interest and current
security status for a given cluster. Network logs
produced by IDSs are seen as a projection of
attack behaviour in a given space and time for
each particular cluster. The assumption here
is that there is a random adversary association
to each cluster as its current security posture is
completely unknown to the attacker The differ-
ent transitions phases in different clusters might
not necessarily change the status in the current
cluster as attackers can participate in more than
one cluster at the same time. An analytic hier-
archy process is employed to effectively model
human behavioural attributes. We divide user
behaviour factors influencing decision(s) into 4
different domains (See Figure 2).
If the reward (gain) for a criminal act within the
cluster is greater than the loss, the probability of
a criminal activity (behaviour) increases. Each
node in a given cluster has a conditional proba-
bility table related to the attributes analysed in
Figure 2. The defence capability C of a given
node dictates the attack strategy to be employed
by an adversary (or group of adversaries) and
often changes motivation M for the attack as
pi











Network Logs (IDPS, LIDS)
Adversarial Behaviour FProjected Attack Behaviour (Estimate)
Figure 1. Input to tracking estimation.
Adversarial Behaviour F
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Adversarial cost
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Figure 2. User behaviour prediction factors using attack behavioural analysis.
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well. The conditional probability p(Ci|Fj) de-
notes the probability of defence capabilities P
in pi and the value of F in Fj such that:
F1 F2 F3 Fj
p1 P(C1/F1) P(C1/F2) P(C1/F3) P(C1/Fj)
p2 P(C2/F1) P(C2/F2) P(C2/F3) P(C2/Fj)
p3 P(C3/F1) P(C3/F2) P(C3/F3) P(C3/Fj)
p4 P(C4/F1) P(C4/F2) P(C4/F3) P(C4/Fj)
p5 P(C5/F1) P(C5/F2) P(C5/F3) P(C5/Fj)
pi P(Ci/F1) P(Ci/F2) P(Ci/F3) P(Ci/Fj)
Table 1. Conditional probability table of node p in a
given cluster Cp.













given that p(Fj) > 0.
The probability of adversary behaviour based
on additional factors is calculated as:
p(F2|C1, P1, S1, M1) = p(C1, P1, S1, M1|F2)p(C1, P1, S1, M1)
=
p(C1, P1, S1, M1, F2)
p(C1, P1, S1, M1)
(9)
We do not account for attacker or victim IDs in
our analysis as their differentiation can only be
distinguished post security incident (successful
or unsuccessful attacks). Intrusion attempts are
often seen as a part of a multi-stage cyber attack
in progress, rather than an isolated event. Lit-
erature indicators have described the reasoning
and logical relationships amongst these attack
phases (stages) including behavioural elements.
Emphasis is placed on the dynamics between
group formulation in the cyberspace and co-
operative actions, rather than on individual and
sporadic attempts to violate security. The adver-
sarial prediction factors can model affiliations
between adversarial groups and disclose their
activities prior to an attack. Elements of these
activities are projected during the attack, which
can help to model attack behaviours more accu-
rately. A generalisation of the algorithm devel-
oped is presented:
Associative adversary group formulation algorithm
Adversarial behaviour F: organised sample of factors in







trackingSet=group of tracked i
Begin







ij=1 p (Ci|Fj) = 1, Tr = 0
/* find all the groups of which i. F is a member of s
with common Tp*/
Group=findgroup(Tp,i.F,i.s);
If p(Fj) > 0 then
group=formulategroup(i.Tp,i.F);
/*keep tracking that group in each s*/
addtotrackingSet(trackingSet, group);
end If
for each groupi in trackingSet
for each groupi =groupk









The DW represents a “green-field” with respect
to the extant academic literature: i.e. a vocation-
ally credible and conceptually rigorous articu-
lation that is compliant with UK Police opera-
tional practice, the Law, socio-cultural norms.
This state of affairs mirrors a wider knowledge
“gap” that has, most recently (as of 2013),
raised serious concerns withinUK Government.
This paper has not sought to address relevant
wider issues of e-governance, though these are
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undoubtedly an area of on-going transnational
concern in view of the fact that concerns have
been raised as to the all-too-easy accessibil-
ity of Cloud based servers by agencies such
as the National Security Agency (NSA); that
is, most Cloud servers worldwide are physi-
cally located within the USA’s, hence NSA’s
jurisdiction. What is clear from the work of-
fered here, within our more self-limited sub-
domain of interest, is that an individual’s rights
and obligations need to be suitably balanced by
a civil society’s imperative to bring to justice
those suspected of wrong-doing. Going for-
ward, we seek to further refine and validate our
preliminary model by constructing simulations
and also by ethically probing “real” DW activ-
ities in a controlled manner. In an attempt to
formalise subjective factors around adversarial
behaviour, our model accounts for the dynam-
ics around adversarial groups formulation in the
cyberspace and DW communities in particular.
These factors can predict potential affiliations
and actions between groups and possible attacks
with behavioural elements affecting outcomes
on multi-stage cyber attacks.
Our primary motivation is to seek to develop,
and help deploy a “useful”, rather than merely
derive an abstract, theoretically accurate predic-
tive P2P attack forecasting model. The model
holds the potential for investigators to track DW
activities of those suspected of active involve-
ment in serious crimes. Namely, to leverage the
“traces”, that are directly or indirectly detected,
derived or inferred from a suspect’s observed
DW inter-nodal activities. The stated Gov-
ernment priority going forward may well upon
those individuals intent upon domestic acts of
extremism. These include The NDEU (Na-
tional Domestic Extremism Unit), and SoCa
(The Serious Crimes Agency), based at New
Scotland Yard. It is recognized that attacker
and defender co-evolve; furthermore, a worry-
ing asymmetry exists, i.e. favourable “odds” in
favour of perpetrators and unfavourable odds
staked against those seeking to pursue individu-
als or groups of perpetrators who readily lever-
age the DW for criminal gain. Our novel and
preliminary model, once more fully developed
and validated, seeks to significantly narrow the
“odds” in favour of those agencies within the
UK, that are the chosen instruments of neme-
sis upon those (relatively few) DW users with
serious dishonest intentions.
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